America's Secret War
A Review of George Friedman's Book on The "War on Terror"
Combining historical insight with geopolitical analysis, America's Secret War discusses the origins and operations of the modern "war on terror".
America’s Secret War by George Friedman is an involving and enlightening account of the workings of the “war on terror” up to the book’s publication in 2004. Despite the speed at which world events have moved in the last three years, it is still well worth a read. Friedman emphasizes the importance of beginning any analysis of the events of September 11, 2001 with the ending of the Cold War, and setting the Iraq war in the context of the balances of power around Iran and Saudi Arabia. Such in-depth analyses don’t date quickly.
Friedman uses a familiar metaphor for foreign policy – that of a game of chess, but gives it an interesting interpretation. Any situation in chess, he says, offers a vast range of options to the novice, but increasingly few as the player grows in skill. Of course this analogy serves the interests of the head of a private intelligence firm (Friedman is the founder and chairman of Stratfor) as it suggests truly skilled players can narrow the field of options to a point where future moves are predictable.
It would also lead Friedman’s readers to look more favourably on world leaders – any dubious foreign policy decisions can be explained as the only moves available to a true master. And taking strategic analysis down to such a technical level means that much of the domestic political sphere is excluded. However, Friedman’s dispassionate and detailed analysis of the “war on terror” is a welcome break from the sensationalist and emotive outpourings which have too often marred public discourse on both sides of the political fence.
Of particular interest is the explanation of al-Qaeda’s strategies and operating techniques. In treating the terrorist organisation as neither a clutch of loonies nor a global octopus of evil, Friedman gives a fascinating insight into the practicalities of covert operations, when they require state co-operation and when they don’t. He also opens up an interesting argument (though one which will requires a lot of evidence to convince many readers) that the last decades of the twentieth century had convinced many in the Arab world that the United States were weak and could not exert military power effectively. Tellingly, he doesn’t make this argument based on conjectures about the “state of mind” of Islamists, but deduces it from their subsequent actions.
Of course most of Friedman’s arguments rest upon his own authority. Unlike, say, Legacy of Ashes, Tim Weiner’s work on the CIA, Friedman does not provide long footnotes and documentation of sources. Indeed his book’s blurb offers information of “a secret terror threat”, “a covert night-time operation” and a “secret agreement between the United States and Iran” – this is contemporary geopolitics, not historical critique. One does not have to take Friedman’s revelations at face value, however, to be impressed by the force of his analysis, and the light it sheds upon current events.
